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Abstract: In a Hotelling duopoly model, we introduce quality that is more
appreciated by closer consumers. Then higher common quality raises equilibrium
prices, in contrast to the standard neutrality result. Furthermore, we allow con-
sumers to buy one out of two goods (single-purchase) or both (multi-purchase).
Prices are strategically independent when some consumers multi-purchase because
suppliers price the incremental benet to marginal consumers. In a multi-purchase
regime, there is a hump-shaped relationship between equilibrium prices and quality
when quality functions overlap. If quality is su¢ ciently good, it might be a dominant
strategy for each supplier to price high and eliminate multi-purchase.
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at the 10th World Congress of the Econometric Society, August 21, 2010, Shanghai, China; the
Conference on Platform Markets: Regulation and Competition Policy, June 1, 2010, Mannheim,
Germany; the 8th IIOC, May 16, 2010, Vancouver, Canada; and EARIE, September 2, 2011,
Stockholm, Sweden.
1 Introduction
Some consumers buy di¤erent variants of horizontally di¤erentiated information
goods (multi-purchasing) like newspapers and software programs, while others buy
only one (single-purchasing). As an example, there are people who install Scientic
Workplace as well as Mathematica on their computers, but others are not willing to
pay for both and installing two copies of the same software on a computer adds
no benet.
For hardware, compare smartphones (e.g., iPhone or HTC) and multi-purpose
computer tablets (such as Samsung Galaxy or Apple iPad). Most smartphones and
multi-purpose tablets have attributes like the ability to play games, make phone
calls, read emails, watch videos, and listen to music. The main source of horizontal
di¤erentiation is the size. Compared to a smartphone, a tablet like Galaxy is superior
for watching videos when sitting in the armchair at home, but a smartphone is
signicantly more convenient when travelling.2 Many people thus end up buying
both a smartphone and a tablet.3 Likewise, a lot of consumers buy both an iPad and
a Kindle. In a press release (December 27th, 2010) Amazon.coms founder and CEO
Je¤ Bezos said that Were seeing that many of the people who are buying Kindles
also own an LCD tablet (e.g. an iPad). Customers report using their LCD tablets for
games, movies, and web browsing and their Kindles for reading sessions. They report
preferring Kindle for reading because it weighs less, eliminates battery anxiety with
its month-long battery life, and has the advanced paper-like Pearl e-ink display that
reduces eye-strain, doesnt interfere with sleep patterns at bedtime, and works outside
in direct sunlight, an important consideration especially for vacation reading.These
devices thus have di¤erent attributes, so multi-purchasing provides incremental value
over buying just one. But what will happen in the market place in the future if both
these goods are improved and o¤er a larger number of attributes?4 How might this
2Due to their size, tablets are awkward for conventional voice telephony, but may be superior
to smartphones for video conferences.
3See the discussion by Mies, PCWorld April 4th, 2010,  iPad Versus the iPhone. URL:
http://www.pcworld.com/article/193420/ipad_versus_the_iphone_why_i_dont_need_bothyet.html.
4With the introduction of Kindle Fire (September, 2011) Amazon in fact introduced a version
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a¤ect prices and prots, and will multi-purchase become more or less likely? How
does competition play out if attributes of the goods overlap substantially? These are
among the questions we address in this paper.
Most economic analysis of discrete choice assumes that consumers buy one unit
of at most one variant (see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992). Yet the exam-
ples above suggest that there are many cases of purchase of (one unit of) several
variants. For each variant, its attractiveness (quality) is increasing in its attributes:
an attribute could be a particular mathematical tool in a software program, cov-
erage of a certain news topic in a newspaper, and a web browsing opportunity or
an e-ink display on a tablet. A consumer will buy several variants to the extent
that this increases the number of di¤erent attributes she can access.5 Thus, for any
given consumer we will observe unit demand (at most) for any particular variant,
but bringing both an iPad and a Kindle on a journey might be useful.
The Hotelling model is the workhorse for analyzing unit demand. We follow this
line, but depart from most of the existing literature in two key ways. First, we model
quality in a novel way. Specically, we assume that the more satised a consumer is
with the horizontal characteristics of a good, the greater will be her marginal utility
of higher quality. On the tablet market, for instance, it is likely that when Amazon
introduces a Kindle with color screen6, then the increased willingness to pay for
that device is more pronounced for a Kindle-lover than for an iPad-lover.7 Second,
we make single-purchase or multi-purchase an endogenous outcome which depends
on consumer preferences, the qualities (the set of attributes) of the goods, and the
strategic choices by the suppliers.
Our rst innovation implies that the better the quality of variants, the higher
of its e-book reader with more attributes. Hence, Kindle Fire is closer to a multi-purpose tablet
like iPad, reducing the incremental value of having both.
5With due tribute to Lancaster (1966) for emphasizing the importance of the characteristics
embodied in goods as the fundamental objects of desire.
6The Kindle Fire introduced in September 2011 has color screen; see footnote 4.
7To our knowledge, the only paper to use a similar formulation is Waterman (1989-90). He
allows quality to interact with transportation costs in an extension of his analysis of the trade-
o¤ between quality and variety in a circle framework. He does not focus on the features of the
formulation highlighted here.
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their prices under single-purchase. This is in sharp contrast to standard results
in symmetric Hotelling models, where prices are independent of whether suppli-
ers provide high-quality or low-quality goods. This feature is also germane to
more traditional circumstances with a single discrete choice between the variants
o¤ered. It seems plausible that prices should increase in product quality under
single-purchasing. But is there reason to believe that the same holds under multi-
purchasing? At the outset one might think so, but actually the opposite might
be true. To see why, suppose that Apple improves iPads ebook reading-quality
and that Kindle becomes more of a multipurpose tablet. This will clearly increase
the stand-alone value of each of the devices. However, it could also reduce the in-
cremental value of having an iPad in addition to a Kindle (and vice versa). Put
di¤erently, while higher quality clearly increases the attractiveness of the goods, it
may also make it less imperative for consumers to multi-purchase. Consistent with
this, we show that there is a hump-shaped relationship between equilibrium prices
and qualities under multi-purchase. One implication of this is that if the qualities
are su¢ ciently high, a dominant strategy for each supplier might be to sacrice some
sales and set such high prices that no-one will buy both products.
The key property of the multi-purchasing equilibrium is that it is a special type
of monopoly regime. Rival quality, but not rival price, determines demand. Prices
are strategically independent even though they are determined by the quality levels
of both goods. The starkly di¤erent properties of the purchase regimes are under-
scored by their comparative static properties. If the market is covered but consumers
buy a single variant, equilibrium prices and prots are increasing in preference het-
erogeneity. By contrast, they are decreasing in preference heterogeneity under joint
purchase.
These results imply that a market situation with multi-purchasing may be very
poorly approximated by a traditional model of single purchases. To take multi-
purchasing into account is fundamental for pricing, just as it is crucial to account
for whether goods are substitutes or complements (see Gentzkow, 2007, who ana-
lyzes competition between print and online newspapers). An illustrative example
is Amazons pricing strategy in response to the introduction of iPad. When iPad
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was introduced, Amazon could sacrice sales for Kindle and set such a high price
that they only attract the most passionate e-book-readers (single-purchase). The
alternative was to follow a multi-purchasing pricing strategy and focus on consumer
incremental value from having both tablets. The above quote from Amazons CEO,
and the fact that the price of Kindle (the 6" version) was reduced from $260 to $139
when iPad hit the market, suggest that Amazons pricing strategy is based on the
incremental value Kindle provides rather than on its stand-alone value.8
2 Related literature
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. Spatial di¤erentiation à
la Hotelling (1929) is a standard tool in product di¤erentiation. It has recently
played a prominent role in media economics, see e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005),
Gabszewicz et al. (2004), Liu et al. (2004), Peitz and Valletti (2008), and Kind et al.
(2012).9 A limitation of the existing literature, though, is that it presupposes single-
purchase (single-homing).10 To some extent the present paper can be considered as
an extension of this literature, since we allow for multi-purchase (multi-homing).
However, there is no advertising market in our model, and we thus abstract from
many of the core issues in media economics. As accentuated in the Introduction,
the application of the model is not restricted to media markets.
The quality formulation we use is somewhat reminiscent of the Mussa and Rosen
(1978) formulation of vertical di¤erentiation insofar as some consumers have higher
8Note that the incremental price is below stand-alone monopoly price. The lower price is of
course consistent with a competitive price under a single-purchase regime too. The presence of
many individuals who own both suggests the incremental price may be the dominant force.
9For analysis of media market competition in non-Hotelling frameworks, see Godes et al. (2009)
and Kind et al. (2008, 2009).
10The literature on two-sided markets (see Armstrong, 2006, and Rochet and Tirole, 2006), uses
the terminology single-homing and multi-homing rather than single-purchase and multi-purchase.
In a two-sided market context, Doganoglu and Wright (2006) analyze how multi-homing a¤ects
rms incentives to achieve compatibility under network e¤ects in a Hotelling framework. In a
Cournot framework, Crémer, Rey, and Tirole (2000) likewise allow for multi-homing when analyzing
rmscompatibility (interconnection) incentives.
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willingness to pay for incremental quality. The present paper is also related to de
Palma, Leruth, and Regibeau (1999), who analyze multi-purchase in a setting with
Cournot competition and network e¤ects, and to Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003).11
The latter extends the Mussa and Rosen (1978) framework by allowing for multi-
purchasing. Two suppliers sell vertically di¤erentiated goods, and consumers may
buy both variants. As in the present paper, consumers do not buy two units of the
same good, and the outcome depends on the incremental utility gained by consumers
from buying both products. Kim and Serfes (2006) analyze multi-purchasing in
a standard Hotelling framework, but in contrast to our model there is a linear
relationship between equilibrium prices and quality.12 Furthermore, in contrast to
both Kim and Serfes (2006) and Gabszewicz andWauthy (2003), we allow for quality
to interact with the distance-based utility, and analyze the incentives to invest in
quality.13
The equilibrium properties are also quite di¤erent from those in Gabszewicz and
Wauthy. While they nd no pure strategy equilibrium for some parameter values,
we always have a pure strategy price equilibrium. In the Appendix we provide a
detailed analysis of demand and reaction functions when we allow for both single-
purchase and multi-purchase, and derive more general properties which apply to
duopoly di¤erentiated products pricing games. These results are useful for other
applications, like spatial models, where kinks in demand are quite natural. We
therefore give results for generalizations of our model, and then illustrate. For
example, we nd that local monopoly equilibrium cannot coexist with competitive
equilibria, and there can be at most two (pure strategy) competitive equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we describe the basic
set-up of the model. Section 4 provides a stand-alone analysis of single-purchase
relevant to both the situation where multi-purchase is debarred by assumption and
where single-purchase occurs in the wider equilibrium. Section 5 analyzes compe-
11See also Ambrus and Reisinger (2006).
12Kim and Serfes (2006) implicitly assume no overlapping attributes or that the attributes are
equally important independent of whether they are endowed in only one or both goods.
13Gabszewicz, Sonnac, and Wauthy (2001) analyze multi-purchase for complementary goods.
They show how price equilibria depend on the degree of complementarity.
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tition under multi-purchase, rst for when it is an equilibrium outcome, and then
for when the purchase regime is endogenously determined. Investment incentives
are analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes and discusses some routes for future
research. Some of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
3 The model
Consider two suppliers, each producing one variant of a good. We normalize the
universe of possible attributes (Q) a good can potentially deliver to 1, and denote
the set of attributes that product i o¤ers by Qi  Q; where i = 0; 1: The larger the
set Qi, the more attractive is good i for the consumers. Each element (attribute)
in Q is assumed to have the same intrinsic value for a consumer. Letting qi 2 [0; 1]
denote the measure of Qi, good 0 thus has a higher quality than good 1 if q0 > q1.
The specics of the multi-purchase scenario are further developed in Section 5.
The goods are horizontally di¤erentiated, and are located at opposite ends of a
Hotelling linewith length 1. Good 0 is at the far left (point 0) and good 1 at
the far right (point 1). Consumer tastes are uniformly distributed along the line.
A consumer who is located at a distance x from point 0 receives utility equal to
R   tx from buying good 0 if it includes all possible attributes (q0 = 1). Here R is
interpreted as a reservation price, and t is the distance disutility parameter from not
obtaining the most preferred type of product. When sold at a price p0, consumer
xs surplus from buying good 0 alone is given by
u0 = (R  tx) q0   p0: (1)
The surplus from buying good 1 alone is similarly given by
u1 = [R  t(1  x)] q1   p1: (2)
The values of q0 and q1 are common knowledge.
The above describes preferences if consumers buy one product or the other, but
we are also interested in the possibility of consuming both products. In Section 5 we
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describe the utility in the case of multi-purchase, where consumers possibly enjoy
greater benet by buying both products.
The formulation in (1) and (2) is novel for the way the quality variable is
introduced, as it interacts with the distance-based utility. In particular, the formu-
lation implies that the smaller the di¤erence between the horizontal location of a
good and the preferences of a given consumer, the more valuable it is for her that
new attributes are added to the good. Put di¤erently, an increase in q0 is more
valuable for consumers located at the left-hand side of the Hotelling line than for
those located on the right-hand side, and vice versa for an increase in q1: Adding a
color screen to Kindle, for instance, is perceived to be more valuable for a Kindle
lover than for an iPad lover. As noted in the Introduction, this is reminiscent of the
Mussa-Rosen (1978) formulation of vertical di¤erentiation.
Aggregating the individual choices generates demands, D0 (:) and D1 (:). We
assume away any marginal production costs of the goods. Let the prot function of
supplier i be given by
i = piDi   C(qi); i = 0; 1; (3)
where C(qi)  0 is the cost of investing in quality, with C 0(qi) > 0 and C 00(qi) > 0:
We assume that C(qi) is su¢ ciently convex to ensure the existence of a stable,
symmetric equilibrium. For the rst part of the analysis, however, we shall consider
the sub-games induced for given qis, in order to elucidate the di¤erences between
the market outcomes at which each consumer buys a single good (single-purchase)
or else some consumers buy both goods (multi-purchase).
4 Single-purchase
Assume for now that each consumer buys one and only one of the goods (single-
purchase). This analysis covers the case when only single-purchase is feasible, and
also the case when it is an equilibrium outcome in the broader formulation when
multi-purchase is allowed but yet does not arise in equilibrium. We restrict attention
to parameter values which guarantee that all consumers are served and that both
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suppliers are operative (market coverage and market-sharing). Below, we show that
there is such an equilibrium if and only if:14
Assumption 1: R  3
2
t
Using (1) and (2) to solve u0 = u1 nds the indi¤erent consumers location as
x^ =
tq0 + (R  t) (q0   q1)  (p0   p1)
t (q0 + q1)
: (4)
Demand for good 0 is thus D0 = x^; while demand for good 1 is D1 = 1  x^.
For given q0 and q1, the suppliers compete in prices. Because demand is linear,
the best reply for supplier 0 is half the choke-price(the price p0 for which x^ = 0).
Transposing subscripts generates the best-reply for supplier 1. Hence the price
reaction function for supplier i is15
pi =
pj + (R  t) (qi   qj) + tqi
2
; i; j = 0; 1 and i 6= j: (5)
Equation (5) makes it clear that prices are strategic complements: @pi=@pj > 0. The
linear reaction function has the standard fty-cents-on-the-dollar property familiar
from Hotelling models. The price-quality interaction is quite novel though, because
the reaction depends positively on own quality in addition to the quality di¤erence
14For higher t values there is a continuum of constrained monopoly equilibria where the market
is fully covered, yet each producer does not wish to cut price and directly compete with its rival.
The consumer indi¤erent between the two products is also indi¤erent between buying and not. For
still higher t values there is unconstrained local monopoly: recall u0 = (R  tx) q0   p0 so that 0s
monopoly demand is x =

R  p0q0

1
t . Its monopoly price, Rq0=2, implies that equilibrium x =
R
2t .
Thus for x < 12 (equivalently, R < t), there is local monopoly. We do not dwell on these parameter
ranges in the text, though they are detailed in the Appendix. Demand functions comprise 2 linear
segments, shallow in the high-price monopoly region, and steeper in the lower-price duopoly
region. The kink begets a downward marginal revenue discontinuity which is at the heart of the
multiplicity noted above, and discussed further in the Appendix. Because the discontinuity is
downward, the monopoly segments in demand do not cause equilibrium existence problems in the
price sub-games, whatever parameters.
15Already the symmetric equilibrium and the rationale for A1 can be seen here: under symmetry,
p = tq. This is the heart of the result that the duopoly region covers the market: recall u0 =
(R  tx) q0   p0 and so at x = 1=2 we have u0 = (R  t=2) q   tq which is positive i¤ A1 holds.
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e¤ect. This implies two important properties: that is reaction function shifts up by
more than js shifts down following a quality change for i, and that equal increases
in both qualities shift both reaction functions up. These two properties underlie the
two Propositions below.
Solving the price reaction functions (for an interior solution, @0=@p0 = @1=@p1 =
0) implies that the outcome of the last stage is
pi =
R (qi   qj) + t (qi + 2qj)
3
; i; j = 0; 1 and i 6= j: (6)
From (6) we nd, as expected, that the (sub-game) equilibrium price rises with
own quality, which is consistent with the property noted above that the own reaction
function shifts up more than that of the rival shifts back. Note also that the price
charged for good i is increasing in the consumersreservation price, R, if it has a
higher quality level than its rival.
The relationship between pi and qj is less clear-cut; the direct e¤ectof better
quality of good j is to reduce pi (see (5)). However, since prices are strategic
complements, the fact that pj rises with qj provides a channel for pi to increase
with qj. We thus nd an ambiguous relationship between pi and qj because
dpi
dqj
=
2
3
 
t  1
2
R

:
Proposition 1: Single-purchase. Prices are strategic complements. A suppliers
equilibrium price rises with an increase in rival quality if and only if t > 1
2
R.
This latter result contrasts with that for the standard Hotelling model (for which
ui = qi   t (jx  xij)   pi: see e.g. Ziss, 1993). In the standard model, a quality
increase worth a dollar (to all consumers) leads to an own-price increase of only
a third of a dollar. Another third is taken up by output expansion, while the
rivals price increase eats up the last third. By contrast, in the present model, a
quality increase is valued more by closer consumers. This e¤ect renders demand
more inelastic and so facilitates higher prices for both. Indeed, while a quality
rise shifts the demand function up parallel in the standard approach, here demand
pivots up around the quantity axis. The pivot (larger increase in willingness to pay
for closer consumers) renders demand more inelastic, and so leads to upward price
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pressure. The greater is t, the stronger is this e¤ect because t represents consumer
heterogeneity, and hence the price rises if t is large enough. The e¤ect is seen
through (6): the quality-di¤erence term multiplying R delivers the standardone
third mark-down e¤ect of an increase in rival quality, but this is o¤set by the term
in t, which dominates if t is large enough (although still satisfying A1).
Inserting (6) into (3) and (4) we obtain the sub-game equilibrium values:
Di =
R (qi   qj) + t (qi + 2qj)
3t (qi + qj)
and (7)
i =
[R (qi   qj) + t (qi + 2qj)]2
9t (qi + qj)
  Ci(qi); i; j = 0; 1 and i 6= j: (8)
From (6)-(8) it follows that if the goods di¤er in quality, then the good with the
higher quality has the higher demand, price and operating prots. It can further
be veried that a higher quality of product i always reduces its rivals output and
protability, although the prices of both goods might increase.
We now characterize the equilibrium if the quality levels are exogenously given
by a common value qS (we use superscript S for single-purchase). In this case the
equilibrium common price (see (6)) is pS = qSt and operating prots are S = qSt=2:
In summary:
Proposition 2: (Single-purchase, symmetry.) In a symmetric equilibrium with
qi = q
S ( i = 0; 1), the suppliersoperating prots are increasing in
a) the heterogeneity of the consumers ( dS=dt > 0)
b) in the quality levels ( dS=dqS > 0).
The result that equilibrium prices are increasing in t is standard (though it does
not hold under multi-purchase, as we show below). However, the quality result
in Proposition 2 is in sharp contrast to standard results in symmetric Hotelling
models, where prices and prots are independent of the quality of the goods.16 In
the standard model, an equal increase in qualities leaves each consumers demand
16This is the obverse facet of the result that prots are independent of (common) marginal costs
in Hotelling models. Basically, competition determines mark-ups independently of common costs:
see the discussion in Armstrong (2006) for implications for two-sided markets.
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the same because the extra quality simply cancels out in a comparison of goods.
Prices are then una¤ected: price neutrality comes from demand neutrality. In our
formulation, from (1) and (2), the willingness to pay increases most for the consumers
in each suppliers own turf. The increase in market power over captive consumers
raises equilibrium prices.
5 Multi-purchase
We now open up the possibility that some of the consumers buy both goods. How
much they gain from buying both goods rather than just one of them depends on the
incremental value of buying a second variant. This in turn depends on the degree of
overlap in the attributes embodied in the two goods. We proceed by rst analyzing
the situation conditional upon multi-purchase actually arising, and then showing
when this is endogenously so.
We assume that the set of attributes Qi o¤ered by good i is drawn randomly from
Q:We can thus interpret (1  qi) qj as a measure of the attributes o¤ered by good j
but not by good i and q0q1 as a measure of the overlap of the set of attributes. When
we allow for multi-purchasing, we must further specify the consumersvaluation of
having access to the same attributes in both goods. We think of consumers as
accruing value from attributes rst on the more preferred product, which we term
the primary product (and will transpire below to be simply the closer one) and then
accrue extra value on the secondary product. We let (1  ) 2 [0; 1] represent the
extra value per overlapping attribute, and specify the incremental benet (gross of
transportation costs) from consuming secondary good j in addition to primary good
i as:
(1  qi) qj + (1  ) qiqj = (1  qi) qj: (9)
As an example of what (9) tells us, look at the tablet market, where one of the
attributes of Kindle is that it can read books aloud for you. If you have a Kindle,
and consider buying an iPad in addition, would it then be important that the iPad
can do the same? If it is, then  is low, while  = 1 if it is not. As another
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example, consider a left-wing and right-wing newspaper, and let a possible attribute
be an analysis of a presidential scandal. If a consumers value of reading about
the scandal in a right-wing newspaper is independent of whether the scandal is also
covered in the left-wing newspaper she reads, then  = 0: If, in contrast, she can see
no additional value of reading about the scandal in both newspapers, then  = 1.
We must distinguish between the case where everyone buys both goods, and the
case where only a fraction of the consumers do so. However, the former is quite triv-
ially straightforward (as will become apparent from the analysis below: it involves
pricing to make the most resistant consumer indi¤erent to adding the product, a
form of monopoly pricing). We therefore deal with the latter case. Figure 1 illus-
trates one possible market outcome, where consumers located to the left of point A
only buy product 0, and those to the right of C only buy product 1. Consumers
located between A and C buy both.
Figure 1: Possible market outcome with multi-purchase.
The utility of a consumer with primary product 0 who buys good 1 for its incre-
mental value over good 0 is
u01 = u0 + f[R  t (1  x)] (1  q0) q1   p1g : (10)
The rst term on the right-hand side of (10) is the utility that the consumer gets
from buying good 0 (primary product). The second term is the additional utility
the consumer obtains from also buying good 1 (the secondary product).
Analogous to equation (10), the utility of a consumer who buys good 0 for its
incremental value over good 1 is
u10 = u1 + f(R  tx) (1  q1) q0   p0g . (11)
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If  > 0 we nd from (10) and (11) that u01 > u10 for x < 1=2. This means that
consumers located to the left of x = 1=2 have good 0 as their primary product and
good 1 as their secondary product, and vice versa for consumers located to the right
of x = 1=2:17 The location of point B in Figure 1 is thus given by xB = 1=2:
A consumer will buy both goods if the incremental value of his secondary product
is positive.18 This means that the location of the consumer who is indi¤erent between
buying only good 1 and buying both goods is given by u10 = u1 (location C in Figure
1): Clearly, for this consumer the price of good 1 is immaterial. Solving u10 = u1 we
thus nd
xC =
1
t

R  p0
q0 (1  q1)

; (12)
so that demand for good 0 depends on own price and the qualities of the two goods,
and not on the price charged by the rival. This key property of the multi-purchase
regime is not an artefact of the uniform consumer distribution in the Hotelling
model, but is a more fundamental property. It stems from the nature of recognizing
the demand as the incremental value, and holds when infra-marginal consumers are
not indi¤erent between buying and not buying, nor between switching brands.19
The above makes it clear that the multi-purchase equilibrium is a special type
of monopoly regime. Rival quality but not rival price  shapes demand. This
property is what makes the regime particularly interesting prices are strategically
independent though they are determined by the quality of both goods. The strategic
17The ranking of the goods as primary and secondary is subject to the consumer actually buying
both goods. If p0; say, is su¢ ciently high, not even consumers located close to point 0 will buy
good 0. However, given that a consumer has bought both goods, his primary good is the one which
is closer to his location.
18The arguments in the text use the incremental analysis approach for clarity. Note
that the full consumer problem is to choose the option that maximizes {(R  tx) q0 +
(R  t (1  x)) q1 (1  q0) p0 p1, (R  tx) q0 (1  q1)+(R  t (1  x)) q1 p0 p1, (R  tx) q0 
p0, (R  t (1  x)) q1   p1}, where the 1st option treats 1 as secondary product, the 2nd treats 0
as secondary product, the 3rd is buying 0 alone, and the 4th is buying 1 alone.
19The property would not hold for example if the demand were specied as a random choice
discrete utility model with i.i.d. idiosyncratic tastes, if choices were dened over all alternatives
(including the joint one). However, it would seem more natural to dene choices in the incremental
manner done above, and then the property would hold still.
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independence here stems directly from prot independence of rival price.20
Inserting (12) into equation (3) and solving @0=@p0 = 0 we nd p0 =
Rq0(1 q1)
2
and D0 = R2t . For good 1 we likewise have p1 =
Rq1(1 q0)
2
and D1 = R2t . Provided
that 1
2
< Di =
R
2t
< 1 (or t < R < 2t), the candidate equilibrium outcomes are thus
given by:
pi =
Rqi (1  qj)
2
; Di =
R
2t
; i =
R2qi (1  qj)
4t
 C(qi); i; j = 0; 1 and i 6= j:
(13)
The restriction that t < R < 2t ensures that each suppliers output lies between
one half and one. This is a necessary condition for there to be an equilibrium where
some - but not all - consumers buy both products.21 The set of parameter values
for this regime might seem rather narrow, in the sense that there is complete multi-
purchase if R > 2t. However, this limited range is an artefact of our simplifying
assumption that consumer preferences are uniformly distributed over the unit line.
With an unbounded support, complete multi-purchase will not arise (and neither
will there be full market coverage under single-purchase for that matter).22
It should also be noted that the clean condition which ensures that partial multi-
purchase is independent of the individual qis (subject to no supplier wishing to
deviate, as addressed below) holds for any preference distribution, since we cannot
have multi-purchase of one good and not of the other.
Proposition 3: Multi-purchase. Prices are strategically independent and extract
the incremental benet to the marginal consumer. Price (and prot) increases with
own quality, and decreases in rival quality and in the overlap of attributes.
20Prot independence is su¢ cient but not necessary for strategic independence consider the
case of Cournot competition and exponential demands (and zero cost), where prots are not
independent, but quantities are strategically independent.
21The outcome that a higher quality induces a higher price holds generally, while the equality
of demands is a property of the uniform distribution in the Hotelling model. Suppose that the
consumer density were f (x). Then 0 = p0F (xC) and d0dp0 = F (xC)  p0f (xC) tq0 (1  q0) and
the candidate equilibrium price is p0 =
F (xC)
f(xC)
tq0 (1  q0). As long as F (:) is log-concave, the
RHS is decreasing in p0 and the supplier with the higher quality again has the higher price.
22Complete multi-purchasing would also be less likely with a uni-modal consumer density (to
the extent to which suppliers care less about a low density of consumers far away).
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The results that dpi =d < 0 and d

i =d < 0 are self-evident because a higher 
reduces the incremental value of the secondary good. This overlap e¤ect is absent
from single-purchase equilibria because the concept of overlap is irrelevant there.
Under single-purchase, we showed that the suppliersoperating prots are strictly
increasing in their expected quality levels and in the heterogeneity of the consumers.
From (13) we nd that the opposite can be true under multi-purchase:
Proposition 4: Multi-purchase. In a symmetric equilibrium with qi = qM
(i = 0; 1); the suppliersoperating prots are
a) decreasing in the heterogeneity of the consumers ( dM=dt < 0), and
b) hump-shaped functions of the expected quality levels if  > 1=2 (with dM=dqM >
0 for qM < 1
2
and dM=dqM < 0 for qM > 1
2
).
Under single-purchase, when consumers become more heterogenous, each sup-
pliers market power over its own consumers increases, resulting in higher prices and
higher prots (dS=dt > 0). Under multi-purchase, on the other hand, greater con-
sumer heterogeneity implies that each supplier will have a smaller market (dDi=dt <
0) and thus lower prots (dM=dt < 0). The intuition for this result is the fun-
damental property outlined above that prices are strategically independent under
multi-purchase, which in turn implies that prices are independent of t. The e¤ect
of greater consumer heterogeneity is consequently only to reduce the share of the
population which is willing to pay for both products.
At the outset, the second part of Proposition 4 might seem even more surprising.
To see the intuition for this result, note that there are two opposing e¤ects for
the suppliers of an increase in qM . The positive e¤ect is that a higher quality
level increases the consumerswillingness to pay for the products, as under single-
purchase. The negative e¤ect of a higher q is to make it less imperative for any of
the consumers to buy both products, thereby tending to increase the competitive
pressure between the suppliers. This negative e¤ect dominates if qM > 1
2
: Only if
 < 1=2; so that consumers have a strong value from consuming both products, will
prices and prots be strictly increasing in qM .
Finally, consider briey the case of  < 0. This corresponds to there being
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complementarities among the common attributes o¤ered by the competing products,
so that enjoying an attribute on one good enhances its value on the other. The
analysis di¤ers from that above because a multi-purchasing consumer will now accrue
the enhanced value of overlap on the primary product. In the earlier case of  > 0
(which corresponds to substitutability of attributes on di¤erent goods), it is the value
of the attribute of the secondary product (the one further away in the characteristic
space) which is diminished. To see this, note that the utility from joint purchase
(ignoring prices) is
maxf(R  tx) q0+(R  t (1  x)) q1 (1  q0) ; (R  tx) q0 (1  q1)+(R  t (1  x)) q1g;
where the former is greater for x > 1=2 if  < 0. This means that, for the case
at hand, the joint-purchase utility for a consumer at x > 1=2 is (R  tx) q0 +
(R  t (1  x)) q1 (1  q0)   p0   p1 and so the incremental utility (over buying
primary product 1 alone) is (R  tx) q0    (R  t (1  x)) q1q0   p0. Setting this
to zero nds the critical x^ which is the demand for supplier 0s product under
multi-purchase. The equilibrium price is found simply as half the (inverse) demand
intercept, which is the demand price from setting x = 0, namely23
p0 =
q0
2
[R (1  q1) + tq1] :
This price is now increasing in both qualities, as expected when attributes are
complementary. The expression di¤ers from that for substitutes (see (13) for  > 0)
through the addition of the extra term in t. In the rest of the analysis, we revert to
the case of  2 [0; 1].
5.1 Exogenous quality levels: single-purchase vs. multi-
purchase
In this sub-section we compare the multi-purchase and single-purchase outcomes
from the perspectives of the suppliers and the consumers, under the constraint that
23To check this, note that inverse demand is p0 = (R  tx) q0    (R  t (1  x)) q1q0, so the
optimal output satises (R  2tx) q0    (R  t (1  2x)) q1q0 = 0, or R (R t)q12t(1+q1) = x. Reinserting
this in the demand, the price is readily veried.
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the goods have the same (exogenous) quality levels. We further determine under
which conditions single-purchase and multi-purchase equilibria actually exist. To
limit the number of cases to consider, we assume that 3
2
t  R  2t: This ensures
that there will be full market coverage under single-purchase (this requires that
3
2
t  R; cf. Assumption 1) and that there might exist an equilibrium with multi-
purchase (as shown above, a necessary condition for an outcome where some, but
not all, consumers buy both goods is that t  R  2t).
In the Appendix we prove the following:
Proposition 5: Assume that 3
2
t  R  2t; and that the quality levels of both
goods are equal to q: Compared to single-purchase, multi-purchase yields
a) lower prices ( pM < pS) and higher consumer surplus (CSM > CSS) and
b) higher prots if and only if q < q  R2 2t2
R2
:
Figure 2, where we have set  = 1; might be helpful to grasp the intuition for
Proposition 5.24 The left-hand side panel of the Figure shows that prices are strictly
increasing in q under single-purchase; a higher expected quality unambiguously al-
lows the suppliers to charge higher prices. This in turns implies that the suppliers
operating prots are increasing in q under single-purchase, as shown by the right-
hand side panel of the Figure. Under multi-purchase, on the other hand, prices and
prots are hump-shaped functions of q; as stated in Proposition 4. Note in particu-
lar that pM ! 0 and M ! 0 as q ! 1: The intuition for this is that the additional
benet of buying a second product vanishes in this case. If prices do not approach
zero, consumers to the left of x = 1=2 will thus buy only good 0 and those to the
right of x = 1=2 will buy only good 1.25 If  < 1, we always have pM > 0 and
M > 0: However, unless  is so small that R
2 2t2
R2
> 1; prots will necessarily be
lower under multi-purchase than under single-purchase for su¢ ciently high values
of q.
Despite the fact that prices are lower under multi-purchase than under single-
purchase, the second part of Proposition 5 shows that M > S if q is su¢ ciently
24The other parameter values in Figure 2 are t = 1 and R = 1:8.
25This is straightforward to see from the term in the bracket of equations (10) and (11).
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small (q < q). In the left-hand side panel of Figure 2 this is true if q < 0:38: The
reason is simply that the price di¤erences under the two regimes are then so small
that the higher sales under multi-purchase (DM > DS = 1=2) more than outweigh
the lower prot margins. It can further be shown that we might have q > 1 if
 << 1; in which case multi-purchase always generates the higher operating prots.
Figure 2: Prices and prots under single-purchase and multi-purchase.
Let us now analyze whether both single-purchase and multi-purchase constitute
possible equilibria. For this purpose, let q 

4
p
R (R  t) + 2t  3R

= (R) : It
can be shown that q > q  R2 2t2
R2
;26 and we have (see Appendix):
Proposition 6: Assume that 3
2
t  R  2t and q < 1: In this case there exist
a) a unique equilibrium with multi-purchase for q < q;
b) multiple equilibria for q 2 (q; q) ; one with single-purchase and one with
multi-purchase,
c) a unique equilibrium with single-purchase for q > q:
Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 3, where we have set  = 0:9 (so that both
pM and M are strictly positive for all values of q). The existence of an equilibrium
is shown by a solid curve, and non-existence of the candidate by a dotted curve.
26To see that q > q; dene z  Rt (with 32  z  2): We then have q   q = 2z2 (A B) ;
where A  2zpz (z   1) and B = (2z + 1) (z   1) : As both A and B are positive, it follows that
q   q > 0 if A > B: This is true, since A2  B2 = 1 + 3z > 0:
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Note that multi-purchase cannot take place if both  and q are su¢ ciently close to
one.
Consistent with Proposition 5, the left-hand side panel shows that consumer
surplus is always higher with multi-purchase, while the right-hand side panel shows
that prots might be higher under single-purchase. However, for q < q the suppliers
also prefer multi-purchase; a supplier which deviates from this equilibrium could
charge a higher price and only sell to those consumers who do not buy the rivals
product, but that would excessively reduce sales. The quality of the products is
simply too low to allow for a su¢ ciently high single-purchase price. This is di¤erent
for q > q; single-purchase prices are then so high that each supplier prefers to
sell only to its most loyal consumers, even if the rival should set the relatively
low multi-purchase price and thus capture the larger share of the market. The
suppliers thereby unambiguously end up in the high price-high prot equilibrium.
For q 2 (q; q) ; though, it is unprotable for either supplier to charge a high
single-purchase price unless the rival does the same.
Figure 3: Single-purchase vs. multi-purchase. Multiple equilibria.
The discussion above provides an intuitive approach to nding the possible equi-
libria that may arise when we open up for multi-purchase. In the Appendix we o¤er
a more formal and general analysis, and explain why we always have a pure strategy
price equilibrium.
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6 Investment incentives
In this nal section we endogenize investments. We start out by deriving the rst-
order conditions for optimal investments conditional upon a single-purchase regime,
and then do likewise for multi-purchase.
6.1 Investment incentives under single-purchase
The rst-order condition for optimal investments in quality of product i under single-
purchase is found by di¤erentiating equation (8) with respect to qi. This yields
@i
@qi
= pi
@Di
@qi
+Di
@pi
@qi
  C 0(qi) = 0; i = 0; 1; (14)
where @D

i
@qi
=
(2R t)qj
3t(q0+q1)
2 > 0 and
@pi
@qi
= R+t
3
> 0. By investing in quality, the supplier
thus expects to be able to increase its equilibrium output and to charge a higher
price. These positive market responses are clearly increasing in the consumers
reservation price R (which places an upper limit on the price that the suppliers can
charge). We further nd the comparative static result:
Proposition 7: Single-purchase. In a symmetric equilibrium with qi = qS ( i =
0; 1), the suppliers invest more the more heterogenous are consumers ( dqS=dt > 0):
Proof: Setting q0 = q1 = qS and inserting for (6) and (7) into (14) we nd that
the rst order condition when evaluated at a symmetric solution is:
4R + t
12
= C 0(qS); (15)
and hence dqS=dt = 1
12C00(qS) > 0. Q.E.D.
The reason why dqS=dt > 0; is simply that the more heterogenous the population
of consumers, the higher is each suppliers market power on its own turf. An increase
in t thus allows the suppliers to set higher prices, making it more protable to invest
in order to increase output. Of course, in equilibrium the suppliers still share the
market equally, so that they do not actually gain any more output. But the higher
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qS induced from a higher t is not a zero-sum game, since the equilibrium price, tqS,
is increasing in the common quality level.
Note that the e¤ect on prots of higher t is ambiguous. The direct e¤ect is an
increase in prot through the price e¤ect noted above. However, rival quality rises
too, and this brings prot down per se. To see the net e¤ect, we use (15) to rewrite
(8) as S = qS

6C 0(qS)  2R   C  qS, where we know that dqS=dt = 1
12C00(qS) .
Hence, di¤erentiating yields
dS
dqS
= 5C 0(qS)  2R + 6qSC"(qS)
=
5t  4R
12
+ 6qSC"(qS)
where we have substituted back (15). By A1 (R  3t
2
) the rst term is negative,
but the second is positive.27 Hence, there exists a fundamental ambiguity in the
tension between the benecial e¤ects of more inelastic demand with the deleterious
e¤ects of higher rival quality. Perhaps surprisingly, the multi-purchase case yields
unambiguous results, despite similar tensions (see below).
6.2 Investment incentives under multi-purchase
To nd optimal investments under multi-purchase, we use (13) to solve @i=@qi = 0:
This yields the rst order condition:
R2
1  qj
4t
= C 0(qi); i 6= j; i; j = 0; 1: (16)
From the comparative static properties of this expression at a symmetric situation
(where qi = qM for i = 0; 1), we can state:
Proposition 8: Multi-purchase (R < 2t): In a symmetric equilibrium with
qi = q
M ; i = 0; 1; the suppliers invest less in quality
a) the more heterogenous the consumers ( dqM=dt < 0)
27The second derivative of i with respect to qi, when evaluated at a symmetric candidate
solution, qS , is (2R t)
2
36tq   C"(qS), which places no further restriction (given that C"(qS) > 0) on
the derivative d
S
dqS
given in the text.
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b) the weaker the consumer preferences for having the same attributes in both
goods ( dqM=d < 0).
Proof: dq
M
dt
=   (1 q
M)R2
R2t+4t2C00(qM ) < 0 and
dqM
d
=   qMR2
R2t+4tC00(qM ) < 0: Q.E.D.
The relationship between consumer heterogeneity and investment incentives is
the opposite in this case compared to single-purchase. The reason why dqM=dt < 0
is that the larger is t, the smaller is the size of the market for each supplier (recall
that Di = R=2t). The gain from investing more in quality to increase the price is
therefore strictly decreasing in t under multi-purchase.
Note that there cannot be asymmetric multi-purchase equilibria if C (:) is convex
enough: from (16), is reaction function slope is dqi
dqj
=   R2
4tC00(qi)
, which exceeds 1 for
C" (:) > R
2
4t
. If the latter condition holds, the rms will consequently be symmetric
in a multi-purchase equilibrium.
Consider now the e¤ect on prots of higher t. By inserting the quality rst-order
condition (16) into (13) we have M =
R2qM(1 qM)
4t
  C(qM). The derivative with
respect to qM is simply qMC"(qM) > 0 and so equilibrium prots necessarily fall
with t. Similar logic indicates that equilibrium prots must fall with . That is,
a lower distinctive overlap value (i.e., more similarity in jointly provided qualities)
hurts prot.
7 Conclusions
We have analyzed a Hotelling duopoly model where quality interacts positively with
consumer closeness, where consumers are not restricted to buy only one good, and
where multi-purchase benets depend on the overlap of functions provided by prod-
ucts. Under single-purchase, prices and operating prots are strictly increasing in
quality levels. In contrast, when some consumers multi-purchase, prices and prof-
its can be hump-shaped functions of the quality levels. If the quality levels of both
goods are su¢ ciently high, the additional benet of buying the second variant might
vanish. Other things equal, competition will then press prices down towards mar-
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ginal costs. However, in this case it may be a dominant strategy for the suppliers to
set such high prices that no-one will buy more than one of the varieties. Whether
there is a hump-shaped relationship between price and quality depends on the con-
sumerspreferences for having the same functionality for di¤erent variants of a good.
This is likely to vary signicantly from market to market. Some consumers clearly
benet from having smartphone and computer tablet with overlapping attributes.
For instance, people may like to play the game Angry Birds on iPad at home and
on iPhone when travelling. If we consider newspapers (or journalism more gener-
ally), consumers may have preferences for a second opinion. However, the number
of people buying both The Times and The Guardian to get both Right-wing and
Left-wing presentations of the state budget is rather small.
One topic for further research is to analyze multi-purchase in a two-sided market
structure. Many information goods, such as online newspapers, are nanced by
advertising. Since these goods are o¤ered for free in order to attract more customers
(and thus increase advertising revenue), the degree of multi-purchasing (termed
multi-homingin this context) is by its very nature high. It should also be noted
that a scoop published by an online newspaper typically becomes available from
rival outlets within minutes. As a consequence, the willingness to pay for a second
online newspaper will presumably be small. This may help explain the observation
that online newspapers rarely charge readers.
We have assumed a particular specication for how components interact. A more
general set-up would specify multi-dimensional heterogeneity in all three dimensions:
say, an individual-specic taste for a combination of the basic goods, their compo-
nents, and how these interact under multi-purchase. And yet, generality tends to
yield paucity of predictions that are restored by restrictions. Accordingly, we have
strong predictions, albeit generated by restrictive assumptions (which we nonethe-
less believe constitute a reasonable starting point).
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8 Appendix
8.1 Discussion of demand and reaction functions
Finding the equilibria for this model is quite elaborate because of the demand kinks.
What we nd is rather particular: there are either two equilibria or one (along with
a possibility of a continuum of local monopoly equilibria that preclude any other
equilibrium). Gabszewicz andWauthy (2003) nd for a vertical di¤erentiation model
with the option of multi-purchase that there is also the additional possibility of no
equilibrium. This is not true in our set-up, and we here explain why. In doing so,
we establish key reaction functions properties. The properties, and the techniques
we use, pertain to other duopoly problems which exhibit kinks in demand, such
as spatial models where kinks in demand arise naturally (e.g., Anderson, 1988,
Anderson and Neven, 1991, Peitz and Valletti, 2008). We therefore detail how to
nd the reaction functions and the implications for equilibria. We exemplify the
text model, but the techniques have a wider applicability.
8.1.1 Finding the reaction functions
The duopoly problem involves best-reply price choices where di¤erent price pairs
correspond to di¤erent demand segments. Typically, price choices can be bounded
below by constant marginal cost (here zero) and some maximum (reservation) price
at which no consumer will buy. In the present case, the maximal price is Rqi,
i = 1; 2, which is the maximum the most dedicated consumer (the one located at
the supplier location) will pay. The strategy space is then a rectangle (a compact
and convex set).
Next, divide this strategy space into the constituent regimes corresponding to the
demand regimes (e.g., local monopoly and single-purchase, etc.) We then nd the
conditional reaction functions, which are the prot maximizing prices conditional
upon being in a particular demand regime. Assuming (as we do henceforth) that each
demand regime entails a strictly (-1)-concave demand,28 these conditional reaction
28This means that the reciprocal of demand is convex in price.
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functions are simply the solution to the rst order condition, because prots are
then quasi-concave over the demand regime.29
When the conditional reaction function lies within its corresponding regime in
the joint price space, the conditional reaction function represents a local maximum
in prot. If the conditional reaction function solution lies above the relevant regime
in the price space (i.e., at a higher price), then prot is increasing in own price
throughout the region. This follows from quasi-concavity of prot. Conversely, if
the conditional reaction function lies below its price-space region, prots are falling
throughout the regime.
We can now deal simply with the boundaries between regimes in the price space.
First, if prots rise towards a boundary from both above and below, then the bound-
ary is a local maximum to prot. This situation corresponds to a downward kink
in demand (i.e., steeper demand for lower prices). Second, if prots rise in both
directions away from the boundary, the boundary is ruled out as being part of the
reaction function since it is a local minimum. This corresponds to an upward kink
in the demand function (and a corresponding jump up from negative to positive
marginal revenue). In this case, the full solution is either a higher or a lower price,
and indicates that prots will need to be evaluated to nd the solution. Last, if
prots rise towards a boundary and continue rising once it is passed, the solution
is not on the boundary. This can occur for both types of kink noted above. Either
marginal revenue each side of the kink is negative, or it is positive. In the latter
case, prots rise as price falls, while prots rise as price rises in the former case.
The upshot is that the conditional reaction functions indicate whether prots
are increasing, decreasing, or locally maximized within a region. This is illustrated
in Figure 5 below for the case at hand. Note that prots are always increasing from
the boundary towards the interior of the price space, because pricing at marginal
cost yields zero prot, and pricing at the reservation price yields zero prots as long
as almost all consumers do not buy at that price (as is true here and most usually).
29In the text model, demands are piecewise linear, so conditional prots are quadratic functions.
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Figure 5: Conditional reaction functions, general case.
Local maxima are then determined by the direction of prot increases. A unique
global maximum is indicated by prot increases toward it from all points below and
above. This will be a boundary (corresponding to the second type of demand kink
noted above) if there is no interior conditional reaction function crossed for the rival
price considered. There remains the case of multiple local maxima, and these need
to be directly compared (although there may still be short-cuts to choosing which
is operative, as per the analysis below).
The reaction functions already enable us to give some characterizations of equi-
librium. We focus here on the properties of the present game: these are nonetheless
shared with several other contexts. First, if the reaction functions are continuous,
there is at least one equilibrium (since they must cross). Second, if the only jumps
are upward, then there always exists an equilibrium if suppliers are symmetric (in
the present case, if q0 = q1). This is because the reaction function must then cross
the 45-degree line (p0 = p1). However, notice that without symmetry, and if the
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reaction function slopes down over some of its traverse (as it does here), it may a
priori be possible that one reaction function goes through the discontinuity in the
other, and so jeopardizes equilibrium existence. In the current problem, and others
of its like, this cannot happen.
The reason is as follows (and this property is shared by other models with similar
properties). For high enough (joint) prices, there is a natural monopoly regime. The
boundary of this regime (in the joint price space) is downward-sloping, and occurs
where prices are such that the market is fully covered and the indi¤erent consumer
at the market boundary between suppliers is also indi¤erent between buying and
not. Call this the Local Monopoly (LM) boundary. Below that regime, reaction
functions slope up, and any discontinuities are upward jumps.
Then there are two cases. Either the reaction functions have already crossed
(at least once) before reaching the local monopoly boundary, or they have not. If
they have not, then they must cross on the boundary or above it. The reason
is that the reaction function follows the boundary down after touching it, and is
then independent of the rivals price (in the interior of the local monopoly regime).
There is then either a continuum of local monopoly equilibria on the boundary, or
else a single one in the interior of the local monopoly region (with some consumers
not buying). This means there must be an equilibrium (involving local monopoly)
if there is no competitive equilibrium. The converse is also true: if there is a
competitive equilibrium then there is no local monopoly equilibrium. To see this,
suppose then that the reaction functions have already crossed. When they reach the
boundary, they move down it, and then strike out independently. This means that
they cannot cross again.
There is a further property of note in the present problem (also shared with
other problems). First, if the reaction functions have positive slope below one in the
competitive regions, and no jumps, there is at most one competitive equilibrium,
and, by the results above, there is only one equilibrium. Second, if there is a
single jump up, and still the reaction functions have positive slope below one in the
competitive regions, there are at most two equilibria in the competitive regions.30
30With k such jumps, there can be at most k + 1 competitive equilibria.
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By the results above, there is no other equilibrium.
In summary, under the conditions given, there is always at least one equilibrium.
If there is an equilibrium with each supplier a strict local monopoly, then there is
no other equilibrium. There are at most two competitive equilibria, and if there are
such, there can be no local monopoly equilibrium. Finally, there can be a continuum
of touchinglocal monopoly equilibria on the local monopoly boundary, in which
case there is no other equilibrium.
8.1.2 Application to the text model
We now analyze the suppliersdemand and reaction functions in more detail. There
are at most 3 interior segments to the individual demand functions.
There are two monopolysegments to demand. For high prices (of both suppli-
ers), each supplier is a local monopoly. Then inverse demand for product 0 is given
by setting the single product utility (1) to zero as
p0 = q0 (R  tx^) ; (17)
where x^ is here and below the demand of product 0.
The other monopolyregion is for low prices, when some consumers buy both
products. They buy product 0 as long as its incremental value is positive; from (12),
0s inverse demand is
p0 = q0 (1  q1) (R  tx^) : (18)
Comparing to (17), (18) is lower, with atter slope. Both demands emanate from
the same horizontal intercept: when p0 = 0, x^ = R=t. We will suppose for the
discussion below that this exceeds 1 (i.e., R  t), as is assumed in the paper. This
implies that demand will be capped at 1 (everyone buys) at a price above zero.
The last segment is the competitive segment imposed by the single-purchase
regime. From (4),
p0 = tq1 +R (q0   q1) + p1   t (q0 + q1) x^; (19)
which is steeper than both of the other monopoly segments above. This segment
moves out parallel as rival price p1 rises, while the other segments stay put.
28
Now superimpose the 3 segments on the same diagram along with the vertical
segment at 1: see Figure 5. Where they intersect is where regimes shift. The critical
values are calculated below, and are given on the Figure: the demand function
is shown in red dots. The inverse demand function is thus given by the attest
segment, (17), until this hits (19) at a price
pLS0 =

2R  t  p1
q1

q0 (20)
It then follows the steepest segment, (19), until it hits the atter segment, (18), at
pSM0 =

2R  t  p1
q1

q0 (1  q1)
q0 + 1
; (21)
which it then follows till it reaches the market constraint (unit demand). Of course,
depending on the value of p1, the single-purchase segment may dominate one or
both of the others over the relevant range. The two kinks in the demand, one up
and one down, generate two di¤erent types of behavior in the reaction function.
The reaction function diagram is usefully broken up into 3 regions, corresponding
to the 3 segments above. From (17) and the analogous condition for good 1, Local
Monopoly for both transpires if 0s monopoly demand,

R  p0
q0

1
t
plus 1s demand,
R  p1
q1

1
t
, sum to no more than 1. This means

2R  p0
q0
  p1
q1

 t. When the
inequality is weak, the market is not fully covered. On the boundary of this regime,
the locus

2R  p0
q0
  p1
q1

= t (the Local Monopoly boundary), demands sum to 1
but there is a consumer with zero surplus. This is the top right region of Figure 5.
At the other extreme, there is joint purchase by some customers if demands for
the two goods sum to more than 1. (If each is 1, there is joint purchase by all con-
sumers.) From (18), demand faced by supplier 0 is

R  p0
q0(1 q1)

1
t
, and similarly
1s demand is

R  p1
q1(1 q0)

1
t
, so the condition is

2R  p0
q0(1 q1)  
p1
q1(1 q0)

> t,
which is the region in the bottom left around the origin in Figure 5. In between
these regions lies the single-purchase region. Its boundaries correspond to the kinks
in the demand curve.
We know from the earlier text what the conditional reaction functions must look
like, conditional on being in a particular region. That is, we can nd the reaction
function corresponding to each demand segment, as if that linear demand constituted
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the actual demand, and intersect it with the region of applicability. As noted in the
preceding sub-section, that is not su¢ cient to nd the reaction function, since the
suppliers may deviate to another conditional reaction function, or indeed to the
higher boundary. This can only happen if another conditional reaction function (or
boundary) lies vertically above or below.
The conditional reaction functions and the derivation of the reaction function
are shown in Figure 6. Recall that a deviation from a region to its own boundary
is not protable since such point was already viable (and revealed not preferred)
on the regions demand segment. Second, the lower boundary cannot constitute a
most protable deviation since the demand kink there is upward, corresponding to
an upward jump in marginal revenue.
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0
0 2
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Figure 6: Conditional reaction functions.
The conditional reaction function for supplier 0 in the joint purchase region is
at right across the region. The next region out is single-purchase, which comprises
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a stripe on top of the joint purchase region; the reaction function is upward sloping
(slope 1/2) across this region. The nal conditional reaction function is the at one
in the Local Monopoly region.
Any price p1 left of the point  in Figure 6 entails a unique local maximum, which
is therefore a global maximum, on the lowest conditional reaction function. For any
price p1 above the point , there is again a unique local maximum, which is therefore
global. It is on the middle conditional reaction function (the single-purchase one)
until this conditional reaction function reaches the Local Monopoly boundary. The
local maximum (hence the global maximum and the reaction function) then follows
the Local Monopoly boundary down until it reaches the highest of the conditional
reaction functions, the local monopoly one, which is then followed to the highest
possible p1.
Between the points  and  there are two conditional reaction functions opera-
tive, and so two local maxima. It is straightforward to argue that there is a jump up
in the reaction function from the lower to the middle conditional reaction function
at some point between  and . Note that at point  the global maximum is on the
lower conditional reaction function: the higher conditional reaction function, having
just begun, represents an inection point at . Likewise, at point  the global max-
imum is on the higher conditional reaction function because the lower conditional
reaction function represents an inection point. By prot continuity along the con-
ditional reaction functions, there is a switch between conditional reaction functions
where they have equal prots. Notice that prot on the lower conditional reaction
function is constant as a function of p1. However, along the higher conditional re-
action function, prot is increasing with p1. Therefore there is a unique rival price,
p^1, where prots are equal, as shown in Figure 6, and the reaction function follows
the single-purchase conditional reaction function beyond that.
We summarize this in Figure 7, where we illustrate the three types of competitive
equilibria. In the rst panel there are two equilibria (one single-purchase and one
multi-purchase). In the second panel there is a unique multi-purchase equilibrium,
while in the third panel there is a unique single-purchase equilibrium.
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Figure 7: Competitive equilibrium types.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 5:
Inserting qi = qj = q into (6) and (8) yields pS = qt and S = qt=2   C(q); while
(13) yields pM = Rq(1  q)=2 and M = R2q(1 q)
4t
  C(q). This implies that
pS   pM = 2t R (1  q)
2
q > 0
for all relevant values of  and q: We further have
S   M = q2t
2  R2 (1  q)
4t
> 0 for q > q =
R2   2t2
R2
:
The consumers who buy only one good are clearly better o¤ under multi-purchase,
since pS > pM : To show that the same is true for those who consume both products,
it su¢ ces to show that the utility of the consumer located at x = 1=2 is higher
buying both products under multi-purchase (uMij (x = 1=2)) than by buying only one
product under single-purchase (uSi (x = 1=2)). This is true because
uMij (x = 1=2)  uSi (x = 1=2) =
qt (1 + q)
2
> 0: Q :E :D :
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8.3 Proof of Proposition 6:
If both suppliers price according to single-purchase, then S = qt=2: Suppose that
supplier i deviates (superscript D), and sets the price that maximizes prots if he
also sells to some of the consumers who buy the rivals product. This optimal price is
independent of the price charged by the rival - cf. the discussion leading to equation
(12)) - such that pDi =
Rq(1 q)
2
and Di =
R2q(1 q)
4t
 C(q): Since Di = M ; it follows
that supplier i deviates from single-purchase if and only if M > S; in which case
also the rival will do the same. This proves Proposition 6a).
To prove Propositions 6b) and 6c), suppose that supplier i believes that the rival
sets the multi-purchase price; pj = Rq (1  q) =2: Will it be optimal for supplier i
to charge a higher price, and accept that he will not sell to any of the consumers
who buy product j? The location of the consumer who is indi¤erent between the
two products is then given by u0 = u1: Inserting for pj = Rq (1  q) =2 this yields
Di =
2 (qt  pi) + qR (1  q)
4qt
:
Solving @i=@pi = 0 we nd
pi =
R (1  q) + 2t
4
q and i = q
(2t+R (1  q))2
32t
  C(q):
Because i > M for q > q =
4
p
R(R t)+2t 3R
R
, it is thus optimal for supplier i to
deviate from multi-purchase and sell only to those who do not buy the rival product
if and only if q > q: If q > q it follows that both the suppliers will have incentives
to set single-purchase prices. However, for this to be an equilibrium, it must also
be true that the consumers will actually not buy both products at these prices. To
check out that this holds, we insert pi = pj = pS into equations (1) and (10) for
x = 1=2 to nd:
up=p
S
i =
2R  3t
2
q
up=p
S
ij =
2 (2R  3t)  q (2R  t)
2
q:
If up=p
S
i > u
p=pS
ij the consumer located at x = 1=2 will only buy one of the products
at p = pS: This requires that q > q  2R 3t
(2R t) (such that the single-purchase prices
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are su¢ ciently high). Calculating the di¤erence between q and q we obtain
q   q = 22
p
R(R  t) (2R  t)  (R  t) (4R  t)
R (2R  t) : (22)
The denominator in (22) is always positive. It can further be shown that the
numerator is positive if R2t (R  t) (R (8R  5t) + t2) > 0; which is always the case
for t < R < 2t: The consumers will consequently not buy both products if p = pS
and q > q: Q.E.D.
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